I. Introduction
Over the past fifteen years, countries around the world have embraced global markets.
This has required a concomitant increase in commitments to policies to promote effective global competition. Within this context, many have questioned the long-standing practice of providing exemptions from national antitrust laws so that firms can cooperate in their export activities. Nine countries have eliminated such exemptions over the last decade (Levenstein and Suslow 2005, Table 3 ). This paper contributes to this discussion by providing an empirical analysis of the largest extant "export cartel" exemption policy, that offered by the United States' Export Trading Company Act (1982) . There are two distinct issues raised by the controversy regarding export exemptions. First, do these exemptions actually lead to increases in the value of exports? Second, if they do increase exports, is this an increase in "mutually beneficial trade" or is it simply a transfer from the importing countries' consumers to the exporting countries' producers through the exercise of market power (as well as potentially creating a deadweight loss to society at large)? In other words, do these export exemptions facilitate the creation of "hard-core" cartels that have the ability to fix prices or allocate markets? 4 Or, as has been argued, do they allow members to share the fixed costs of marketing, transportation, and finance necessary to participate in international markets, thereby increasing competition in international markets and giving global consumers more choices? 5 Or, as others have concluded, do they have little or no impact at all? 6 Small firms, especially in countries that have only a small share of the global market, are unlikely to be able to use export exemptions to exercise market power. Even export associations that are able to exercise market power may also share the fixed costs of exporting. As was argued by the U.S. representative at a meeting of the WTO's Working
Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy: 7 ...so-called "export cartels"... typically were conceived as mechanisms for domestic entities that lacked the resources to engage in effective export activity acting individually. As such, they often had pro-competitive effects in that they added additional players to the relevant markets and might bring innovation or lower prices. Moreover, they were not secret and therefore did not bear the hallmarks of what was traditionally considered to be a hardcore cartel.
The empirical task, then, is to provide an answer to a somewhat more nuanced version of the question posed above: do these exemptions increase exports, and if so, when and by whom?
Although many countries offer exemptions for export activity, either explicitly-such as Australia and Canada-or implicitly-as is the case for almost all members of the European Union-we focus in this article on the economic effects of ETCs granted by U.S. law. 8 We do this for the simple reason that the U.S. is the only country for which we have been able to find data amenable to statistical analysis. 9 In order to conduct even a relatively aggregatelevel study of the effect on exports of granting exemptions for joint export activity, one needs to know the products produced by firms granted these exemptions. This information is publicly available in the U.S. for most ETCs in the Federal Register, where all ETC applications are published, as required by law. 10 The U.S. experience is unique in many ways, and the results presented here may not be applicable to firms in smaller or lessdeveloped countries. Still, as the only empirical analysis of the economic effects of contemporary export cartel exemptions, it provides useful statistical grounding for policy discussions.
We first survey the legal status of exemptions for export activity around the world and present the limited evidence that exists on the use of these exemptions by exporting firms.
We then discuss the specific nature of the exemptions provided by the ETC Act (since they differ in several ways from the older WP Act). Then, in providing descriptive statistics on the 195 ETCs granted from 1983 through 2004, we attempt to give an accurate picture of the types of firms that apply for these certificates and the nature of the restrictions placed upon them by the Department of Commerce, which administers the ETC Act, and the Department of Justice, which reviews all applications. Regression analysis is used to analyze whether industries in which ETCs have been granted have higher growth in exports.
8 See Levenstein and Suslow (2005) for a discussion of the status of antitrust exemptions for exporters throughout the world, and the associated notification requirements. 9 See Levenstein and Suslow (2005) , pp. 795-96 for a discussion of data available on export associations from competition agencies in other countries. 10 After the application is published in the Federal Register, there is a waiting period of ninety days during which the public is invited to comment.
We find that the real value of exports in manufacturing industry sectors with export cartel exemptions is higher than in comparable manufacturing industry sectors without an exemption. But this result is driven exclusively by the selection process among industries which elect to obtain ETC exemptions. Analysis of the impact of receiving an ETC exemption on exports, controlling for the growth rate of exports in the industry, shows that on average ETCs do not increase exports. In some estimates, the real value of exports actually falls after receiving an ETC. There are two possible explanations for this. One is that firms choose to obtain an ETC exemption when they are concerned that exports in the sector are going to fall. Receiving an ETC thus precedes this fall in exports, but does not cause it. The second possible explanation is that industries with ETCs can in fact exercise market power and the decline in the real value of exports reflects a strategic reduction in the quantity of goods exported. Given the predominance of ETCs in relatively unconcentrated industries we believe the former explanation is more plausible.
II. Global Trends in Export Exemptions
Of the fifty-five countries for which we have obtained information, seventeen provide explicit exemptions similar to those provided by the U.S. ETC Act (Levenstein and Suslow 2005, p. 800) . Six of these countries require prior review (Australia, Israel, New Zealand, South Africa, Taiwan, and the U.S.), while others simply require notification and will review the nature of the cooperative export activities only if a question is raised about possible anticompetitive effects. As in the U.S., where trade associations can apply for an ETC, exemptions are sometimes provided to associations or groups of firms. In some countries, such as Australia and Israel, exemptions are provided for specific transactions, rather than the blanket exemptions granted for an indefinite period of time to U.S. ETCs.
Thirty-five countries have no explicit exemptions (e.g., Argentina, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain), but instead restrict their competition legislation to the domestic market, with no mention of behavior affecting foreign markets. 11 In doing so, these countries limit the scope of their antitrust law, and grant export exemptions by negative implication. The
European Union is an example of this form of implicit exemption: firm behavior that lessens competition in foreign markets is simply not mentioned in the competition laws, while domestic price-fixing is explicitly prohibited.
In nine of the thirty-five countries that restrict their laws to the domestic market, this implicit exemption is a recent phenomenon. For example, Germany, Japan, and South Korea all had explicit exemptions until the late 1990s. 12 One drawback to this trend toward implicit exemption is that there is no reporting requirement covering cooperative activity for export, and therefore no oversight or information about the extent of any such activity.
Given this global patchwork of explicit and implicit exemptions, with some countries requiring notification and others not, it is impossible to determine how prevalent joint export activity is today. Historically, when explicit exemptions requiring notification were more common, the numbers were relatively high. the authority exists to revoke an ETC for violation of its terms (other than not filing an annual report), this has never occurred.
The ETC Certificate delimits the scope of the exemption provided to the ETC and its members. The Certificate specifies the geographic region where joint export activity is permitted, the products covered by the Certificate, and the nature of activities in which the ETC is permitted to engage. In some cases, these specifications are very general and permissive (e.g. "all parts of the world, except the United States" and "all products"), but in other cases they are very specific (e.g., exports are limited to "Japan" or "fresh cultivated blueberries"). An example illustrates the general nature of ETCs and the kinds of activities in which they are given permission to engage. The ETC granted to the U.S. Textile Export
Company (TEXPORT) in August 1995 had the following features (among others):
• 13 members The full expectations of the Webb Act's proponents have not been realized over the half century since its passage. The hope that with antitrust exemption hundreds of associations would be formed to serve as joint selling agents for small firm exports remains but a vision. During the period 1918-65, a total of 176 associations were properly registered with the Federal Trade Commission; of these, only 130 ever functioned in a way to assist U.S. exports…
The FTC found that approximately one-third of all registered associations functioned for five years or less, and that WP-assisted exports were at most 2.4 percent of total U.S.
exports. 29 The difficulty in measuring whether an export association actually functions "to assist U.S. exports" is of great significance, both for assessing the effects on the WP Act and the ETC Act. A 1978 FTC study focused on this problem, stating at the outset of their report that " [i] nadequate data has shown up as a glaring deficiency of most assessments of the Webb-Pomerene Act." 30 The authors of the 1978 FTC study used a survey designed to 26 Federal Trade Commission (1967 , 1978 . Earlier government reviews were done in 1929 and 1946, and independent reviews were conducted as well (see Federal Trade Commission, 1967, pp. 8, 11-12 carefully account for exports that were directly assisted by Webb-Pomerene exemptions from antitrust laws. Their goal was to distinguish these exports from those where an association of firms was not required (that is, exports made by an individual firm, acting independently, even though that firm happened to be a part of a WP association). The FTC found that "assisted exports" were only 1.5 percent of total U.S. exports in 1976. 31 With such a limited embrace by businesses, it is difficult to imagine that the benefits of the WP Act outweighed the administrative costs and the potential risk of anti-competitive spillovers to the domestic economy.
Empirical research by Andrew Dick (1992 Dick ( , 1996 "commercial trailers for construction, heavy equipment and other hauling, truck tractors, and parts and supplies therefor." The 2-digit NAICS category that these products fall in would be "Manufacturing"; the three digit category is "Machinery Manufacturing"; the four-digit category is "Agriculture, Construction, and Mining Machinery Manufacturing"; and the 6-digit category that we assign is 333120, which is "Construction Machinery Manufacturing."
Of the 195 ETCs granted from 1983-2004, we were able to link 106 ETCs to specific manufacturing NAICS categories. There are several reasons for the drop in sample size.
Some export certificates do not restrict the products that the ETC can export: for example, NYVZ Import and Export, Inc. is permitted to export "all products" and Hammerl-Davis International, Inc. has permission to export "all industrial and consumer products." Other have export data (e.g., Intex's certificate covers "consulting engineering service" and Marine Midland Trade's certificate covers "all services"). We also eliminate from our sample ETCs that exclusively export agricultural products because it was not possible to obtain many of the other relevant variables necessary for analysis. In particular, we do not have industry-specific exchange rates for agriculture, nor do we have a measure of market concentration consistent with the manufacturing data.
Many ETCs have permission to export products that fall into multiple NAICS codes; that is, they export more than one type of product. Conversely, several NAICS categories have more than one ETC operating in them. The vast majority of all Certificates -141 out of 195 -explicitly allow the ETC members to fix prices. Among ETCs included in our regression sample, 80 out of 106 are granted the right to set prices. Certificates are extraordinarily detailed in specifying the conditions under which firms in an export association may fix prices. We treat all of the following language as providing the ETC with explicit permission to fix prices:
• "may negotiate and agree on the terms … including … the price to be bid"
• "may enter into agreements… that contain price… restrictions"
• permitted to "discuss method for setting export prices"
In some cases the permission to set prices is qualified. For example, one certificate provides that the ETC may "[e]stablish export prices …with each Member being free to deviate from such prices by whatever amount it sees fit" (emphasis added). 52 Waller (1992) analyzes the type of price-fixing each ETC is permitted. He finds that slightly more than half 50 Kryzanowski and Ursel (1993, p. 379) of the ETCs through 1990 sought certification for "the full range of price setting, production restriction, and policing powers normally associated with cartel behavior" (p. 252). We count all of the categories listed above (including the ETCs that are "free to deviate" from ETC-set prices) as a form of price fixing. Using these criteria, a little over a quarter of all ETCs do not have permission to fix prices. In some cases, the Certificate makes no mention of price fixing. In others, the language is sufficiently restrictive that we deem it not to provide permission to fix prices. Examples of this more restrictive language include:
• "may...[c]ontact individual suppliers to elicit information relating to sales of products and services in the Export Markets, including price, volume, and estimated delivery schedules."
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• "Provide to suppliers on an individual basis information on specific solicitation (including price…)"
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• "Invite suppliers to provide independent price quotations"
55
• "collect information on the Export Markets to assist Members in determining the market price"
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In almost all cases, explicit permission to fix price is accompanied by an explicit restriction on sharing of information on costs or other restrictions that are designed to limit anti-competitive spillovers in the domestic market.
Prior experience with Webb-Pomerene Associations
It is possible that an ETC might be more successful if some or all of its member firms had 
VI. Economic Impact of the ETC Act

A. Empirical Specification
We expect a country's exports to be a function of global economic activity and relative prices (reflected in exchange rates). 57 We estimate the determinants of the real value of U.S.
manufacturing exports, disaggregated to the 6-digit NAICS level, from 1978 to 2004. We begin the sample in 1978 in order to control for trends in exports prior to the passage of the ETC Act and the granting of the first ETC exemptions.
We include in these estimates a dummy variable indicating whether an ETC had permission to export in the 6-digit NAICS product group. If an ETC allows firms to overcome fixed costs associated with exporting, permitting joint activity among firms in the sector should increase exports, all else equal. If, on the other hand, ETCs facilitate the exercise of market power in foreign markets, receiving an ETC has an ambiguous impact on the value of total exports. In this case we would expect the quantity of exports to fall and the price to rise. To the extent that our measure of the real value of exports controls for changes in price -because the nominal value of exports has been adjusted by an overall export price index -we would expect the total value of exports to fall in industries where the ETC can exercise monopoly power. 58 However, our price index is much more aggregate than are the products affected by ETCs; any increases in prices of specific ETC products are likely to be masked by the large number of other products in the price index. Thus, the effect on the total value of exports depends on the elasticity of demand. If ETCs operate in industries with elastic demand, or are effective enough to raise price to the elastic region of demand, then we would expect to see declines in total revenue. If ETCs operate in industries with inelastic demand or are unable to raise the price to close to the monopoly level, then the total value of ETC exports would increase even though the quantity of exports had fallen.
We follow the standard trade literature in our specification of the demand for U.S. exports In our empirical specification below we consider a NAICS to have an "active" ETC in the first seven years after an ETC Certificate was issued. Because we expect an ETC to have its greatest impact in the first few years after the ETC has been issued, in some specifications we 58 See Data Appendix for description of export data and the export price index used to deflate the export data.
allow the impact of the ETC to diminish over time. In other specifications, we examine differences in differences, using industry fixed effects to control for industry-specific trends in exports that are distinguishable from the specific impact of receiving an ETC exemption.
We begin by estimating the following equation for the determination of export growth:
Ln Exports = β 1 + β 2 Ln(Non-US GDP) + β 3 Ln(Exchange Rate) + β 4 ETC + β 5 HHI + β 6 ETC*HHI + β 7 Industry where 59 :
• Exports: Real value of exports in millions of 2000 U.S. dollars Table 3 .
We use a NAICS-level fixed-effects estimator to control for unexplained cross-sectional variation in export trends. There are 325 unique NAICS included in the regression sample.
Aggregating across years, 235 of the 325 unique NAICS never contain an ETC.
59 See Data Appendix for detailed variable definitions and data sources. 60 The exchange rate index, including the most up-to-date revisions, was generously provided by Linda Goldberg of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. See Data Appendix for details.
B. Empirical Results
Our estimates of the demand for U.S. exports are generally similar to those of previous estimates. We find that increases in foreign GDP significantly increase demand for U.S.
exports. We estimate the elasticity of demand for exports as a function of non-US GDP as 2.03, somewhat smaller than found by Krugman and Baldwin (1987) and Bahmani-Oskooee and Ardalani (2006), and somewhat larger than Bahmani-Oskooee (1991). Our estimates of the sensitivity of U.S. manufacturing exports to changes in the value of the dollar are also comparable to those in the literature. We find that exports are essentially unit elastic with respect to fluctuations in our exchange rate index.
Our OLS estimates suggest that the receipt of an ETC exemption significantly increases industry exports (Table 4 ). The coefficient of 0.69 on our ETC dummy implies a doubling of exports associated with having an ETC exemption. The 95% confidence interval suggests that industry exports are between 63 and 144 percent higher in each of the seven years after receiving an ETC exemption than in other industries and years. Concentration itself has a positive but negligible effect on exports. The benefit gained from an ETC exemption seems to be the same regardless of industry concentration as implied by the insignificant coefficient on the ETC-HHI interaction variable.
These results are reversed in the fixed effects (FE) estimates, reported in Table 5 . This approach controls for idiosyncratic trends in export growth at the level of individual 6-digit NAICS. Once we have controlled for trend growth at this more disaggregated level, the ETC dummy variable has a statistically significant negative impact on exports. The -0.10 coefficient implies a reduction of exports by 10%. The GDP and exchange rate coefficients are unchanged in the FE estimates. HHI switches sign, suggesting that exports fall as concentration increases, but the size is still extremely small. The interaction term, estimating the differential impact of ETCs in industries of different concentration, is still insignificant.
There are several possible explanations of this result. First, exports may be growing more quickly in industries with ETCs for reasons entirely unrelated to having an ETC. We speculated that export growth might actually lead an industry to choose to get an ETC, but this does not appear to be the case. Regression estimates attempting to predict which industries would obtain ETCs as a function of prior export growth displayed entirely insignificant results. This also indicates that the ETC exemption is not being used disproportionately by those industries that the U.S. Congress had in mind in adopting the ETC legislation, namely those in which exports were declining as a result of increased competition from cooperating foreign firms. It is likely, however, that the positive association found in the OLS results does reflect the choice by industry participants to get an ETC: it is industries with firms that want to increase exports that get an ETC.
Second, as is clear from this discussion, receipt of an ETC exemption is not exogenous, but is a decision of members of the industry. We were unable to control for this endogeneity using standard methods because there is no obvious instrument for ETCs. However, it is not clear how this endogeneity biases our results or might explain the difference in the results of OLS and FE estimation, if in fact export growth is not the driving factor in ETC selection.
One possibility is that firms get an ETC because they are concerned that exports will fall, or not grow as fast, in the future, but that the receipt of the ETC exemption does not stem the decline.
Third, it is possible that the receipt of an ETC exemption allows member firms to exert market power and strategically decrease exports. We think this is unlikely because most ETCs are in industries that are not concentrated even within the United States. Figure 3 shows the distribution of ETCs by HHI. The vast majority are in industries with an HHI below 1800, the U.S. Justice Department's cutoff for concern regarding market power. 61 This point is even more emphatic once we control for differences in exports across industries. and Federal Trade Commission, 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992 , with 1997 revisions, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html.
We examine the "market power" hypothesis more carefully with the inclusion of a dummy variable indicating whether the ETC was given the authority to fix prices. In the OLS regression (Table 6 , column 1), this variable, which is highly collinear with simply having an ETC, is negative but statistically insignificant. In the FE specification (Table 6 , column 2), the significance of having an ETC disappears; the "price fixing dummy" is picking up all of the negative effect previously picked up by the ETC dummy. Thus it appears that any negative effect on exports is restricted to those with the authority to fix prices.
In some specifications, we also include a variable controlling for prior Webb Pomerene experience. In the OLS estimates, this variable was not significant. In the FE estimates, however, the WP variable was associated with higher exports. It is surprising to find any statistically significant effect, given the small number of ETCs with prior WP experience. We suspect that the association with higher exports reflects the longer history of engaging in export activities in these industries. Export data disaggregated to the level we use in this study may be plagued by measurement problems. To make sure that measurement problems were not driving our results, we re-estimated all of our regressions eliminating outliers. We did this both by eliminating observations with error terms greater than three standard deviations and by eliminating observations where exports increased or decreased by more than three standard deviations greater than the average growth rate. This procedure eliminated approximately one half of one percent of all our observations. Both the OLS and the FE estimates results were robust to the elimination of outliers.
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In order to better understand why receiving an ETC is associated with a decline in exports, we estimated (both OLS and FE) regressions in which the ETC dummy was replaced by seven separate dummy variables: ETC t indicates that an ETC exemption had been received t years previously. This allows us to distinguish between the immediate and longer run impact of the ETC. The OLS results ( we look at the fixed effects results (Table 7 , column 2), the coefficients on the ETC dummies are negative, as in the single dummy estimate, but they are not statistically significant. This reinforces our view that ETCs do not cause exports to fall. In most industries with ETCs, there is not sufficient concentration to suspect a strategic reduction in exports. In other industries, where the choice to ask for an ETC exemption reflects a desire to increase exports it is inconceivable that the ETC has negative impact on exports. The ETC is not binding on participants; in fact, over half of ETCs are voluntarily relinquished after a period of time.
Of course, it is possible that different results might be obtained if one looked at the exports of the ETC and its member firms, rather than those of the industry as a whole (which we are forced to do because of data limitations). A complete analysis of the impact -positive and negative -of the ETC Act would require access to information that Congress has chosen to prohibit.
There is nothing in the analysis that we present here that lends support to the notion that ETCs increase exports above what they would be absent an antitrust exemption. It seems unlikely, given their prevalence in unconcentrated industries, that ETCs exercise much, if any, market power -either inside or outside the U.S. market. Thus our results are consistent with earlier, more qualitative studies of ETC Act and WP Act antitrust exemptions. As discussed above, most of these studies concluded that the aggregate economic impact of these exemptions was small, both in their intended purpose of assisting U.S. industry and in promoting the exercise of market power.
An important caveat to this research is that our analysis only examines U.S. ETCs. It does not necessarily follow that our analysis can be extended to other countries, particularly ones with less developed infrastructure for facilitating exports. In such cases, export exemptions for industries with substantial numbers of firms, especially small firms with little history of export activity, may well be justified. However, exemptions for industries that are dominated by one or two firms may simply allow the larger firms to retain their position of dominance rather than encourage exports by smaller firms.
Our analysis also excludes ETCs that were granted permission to export "all products," and the regressions cover manufacturing only (excluding agriculture). It is possible that those ETCs with permission to export "all products" are somehow different. Without more data, it is impossible to know. It is also possible that the results for agricultural associations would differ as well, but our guess is that they would not. Some of the agricultural ETCs are regional associations of many small agricultural units (e.g., Oregon blueberry exporters).
These ETCs are unlikely to be able to exercise market power in global markets and may well benefit from coordinating among themselves so that they are less dependent on intermediaries for accessing foreign markets. On the other hand, some ETC members are very large agricultural exporters, and these ETCs may be able to exercise market power.
VII. Concluding Remarks
Antitrust exemptions for exports appear to be associated with a small decline in the real value of industry exports. * Many of these ETCs covered products that fall into several NAICS codes (that is, they export more than one type of product). There are 106 ETCs for which we were able to identify specific products, exporting in 90 different NAICS categories. R-squared: within = 0.3188, between = 0.0668, overall = 0.0433 Table 6 Controlling for WP and permission to fix prices 
